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LIn a recent issue of this journal, Robert Oakes has 
proposed a “Cartesian conundrum,” arguing that certain elements in Descartes’ 
philosophical theology are incompatible.^ I believe that this conundrum can be 
solved. It does, however, lead to an interesting question about what constitutes 
the “materiality” of a material object. In this article I propose to solve the conun­
drum, and to say a little about that question.
The Cartesian theses which Oakes takes to be incompatible are the claims that 
God exists necessarily, that contingent things depend for their continued existence 
(perdurance) on God’s conserving activity, and that there exist some (non-Berke­
ley ian) contingent material objects. And what is non-Berkeley ian materiality? 
Oakes suspects that the attempt to provide a full analysis may be “quixotic,” but 
he provides a necessary condition: “conceivably, anything which is a material 
object is able to perdure without depending for such perdurance upon its having 
the relational ‘epistemic’ property of being an object of awareness.” And again, 
such an object “lacks the property being dependent upon awareness for perdur­
a n c e (p. 146)
Given this understanding, Oakes formulates his argument as follows (p. 148):
(1) All contingent/finite things {a fortiori material things) depend for their existence— at 
all moments through which they perdure— upon the conserving activity o f God. (sub­
scribed to by Descartes)
(2) [] (God exists.) (subscribed to by Descartes)
(3) ~ < >  [There exist contingent/finite things {a fortiori material things) that do not 
depend for their existence— at all moments through which they perdure— upon the con­
serving activity of God.] (from 1 and 2)
(4) [] [God (if existent) is aware of what He conserves], i .e ., ~ < >  (God conserves 
something o f which He is not aware.) (self-evident)
(5) [] [Whether God conserves something depends (at least in part) upon whether He is 
aware of it.] (from 4 and AP)
(6) ~ < >  (There exists a material thing that does not depend for its existence— at every 
moment through which it perdures— upon being an object o f God’s awareness.) (from 3, 
4, and PTD)
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(7) ~ < >  (There exists a material thing that does not depend for its existence— at every 
moment through which it perdures— upon being an object o f awareness.)^ (from 6, a 
fortiori)
In this derivation, PTD is the claim that the relation of dependence is transitive, 
and AP is the claim that every state of affairs which is a necessary condition for 
S ’s obtaining is something upon which S depends.
This argument, it seems to me, is fallacious. The difficulty lies in the derivation 
of (3) from (1) and (2). Formally, at least, that deduction is invalid. (1) is unmo- 
dalized as it stands, and hence it is formally compatible with the supposition that 
it was within the power of God to create things which can perdure without His 
conserving activity, but that He freely chose not to create any such things.^ In 
that case such things would be possible, though not actual.
There are probably ways of remedying this defect. For the sake of getting to 
the more interesting feature of this conundrum we may as well just assume that 
the argument begins with (3) as a premise, rather than as a derivation.
That deeper difficulty begins with our understanding of (4), a proposition which 
Oakes says is self-evident. Consider first what we might call the doctrine of omni­
awareness:
(4*) [] [God (if existent) is aware o f everything which exists.] Since presumably 
the things which God conserves constitute a subset of the things which exist one 
would suppose that (4) would follow from (4*). Immediately after formulating 
his argument however, Oakes makes a special point o f denying this entailment, 
and of denying that his conundrum can be generated on the basis of (4*). And 
that suggests that Oakes understands (4) in terms of some “internal” relation 
between awareness and conserving, a relation which is not entailed by omni­
awareness. What might that be?
My own conjecture is that in asserting (4) Oakes really has in mind some 
proposition such as:
(4') [] (God’s conserving of any object X depends on His awareness of X.)
And perhaps he would say that God could not conserve me in existence, for 
example, if He were not aware of me, presumably because without that awareness 
He would not be able to direct His conserving activity accurately “in my direction.”
I don’t know whether (4') is self evident. In any case, however, there is some­
thing plausible about it, so perhaps we can accept it, at least tentatively. But (4') 
is equivalent to Oakes’ (5). We can therefore think of the argument as beginning 
with (3) and (5) as premises. (7) does follow from these premises, and (7) appears 
to be incompatible with the claim that there are some (non-Berkeleyian) material 
objects. But this incompatibility holds only if we understand (non-Berkeleyian) 
materiality in Oakes* way. Perhaps we should not understand it in that way.
According to Oakes, a necessary condition o f an object’s being material in an 
“ontologically significant” (i.e ., non-Berkeleyian) sense is that no element of 
awareness should be a necessary condition of that object’s perdurance. That means 
that a sufficient condition of a material object’s being merely Berkeleyian is that 
some element of awareness is necessary for that object’s perdurance. But that 
seems highly implausible.
Of course, we can accept Oakes’ necessary condition as (part of) the definition 
of a special class of possible objects, those which he calls “ontologically signif­
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icant.” If we do that, however, we must recognize that there is no reason to 
suppose that this class is the complement of the class of Berkeleyian objects. 
There may well be a third class o f objects, neither Berkeleyian nor (in Oakes’ 
sense) “ontologically significant.” Objects of this third class may well be the sort 
of object that Descartes was thinking about, and they may also correspond to 
some “ordinary” concept of what a material object is. And Oakes’ argument does 
not show that the existence of objects of this third class is incompatible with the 
other elements in Descartes’ philosophical theology.
To see this, think of the Berkeleyian slogan, esse est percipi. This surely does 
not suggest merely that percipi is a necessary condition o f esse. It is rather that 
percipi is sufficient, as well as necessary, for esse. The esse o f a Berkeleyian 
material object just is its percipi— perhaps a special percipi (that of God) but 
nothing other than percipi. There isn’t anything to a Berkeleyian material object 
over and above God’s awareness of it, and so that awareness is sufficient for the 
existence of such an object. We can therefore think of a kind of object which 
differs from a Berkeleyian object not because awareness is not a necessary con­
dition of its existence, but rather because awareness is not sufficient for it. And 
it may well be that this is the sort of object which Descartes had in mind, and/ 
or the sort of object which corresponds to our “ordinary” concept of materiality.
If that is true, then it is possible that material objects require God’s conserving 
action for their perdurance, and that God’s conserving action requires His aware­
ness of the object which He is conserving, and that nevertheless the objects thus 
conserved are Cartesian rather than Berkeleyian. God’s awareness would be nec­
essary for such objects, but it would not be sufficient for them. And it would be 
precisely because such objects have “something more” in them— their Cartesian 
materiality— that God’s awareness is not sufficient to sustain them in existence. 
They require that God do something more than perceive them— that He perform 
an act of conservation— ĵust because their esse is something more than percipi.
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NOTES
‘Robert Oakes, “Material Things: a Cartesian Conundrum,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 
(1983) 144-150.
^Unfortunately, the “not” in this proposition was omitted in the printed version. But it is intended 
by Oakes (personal communication).
^This proposition is in fact formally compatible with the stronger claim that there are two objects 
which have all of their essential properties in common, but which differ from each other in that one 
requires, and the other does not, the conserving action of God for its perdurance.
